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Challenges in Law Making in Mass Societies
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
The setting for law making today and tomorrow is the mass
society, or, more precisely, an evolving set of mass societies.
I. THE MASS SOCIETIES
The largest of the mass societies of course are China and India,
each with a billion members.' Also very large are Europe and the
United States. Europe is a multinational system having about 730
million in population (depending on which countries are
included), 2 and has been interpreted as a federal system, actual or
emergent. The United States is a federal system having upward of
300 million in population. Other very large national systems
include Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, and Russia. Large
multinational regions having substantial transborder legal
relationships include some of these national systems, such as the
NAFTA countries (Canada, Mexico, and the United States);
Mercosur in Ibero-America (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uroguay); those in the Western Pacific interconnected with China
and Indonesia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Australia);5
and the actual or potential relationships in Africa and in the Middle
East.
6
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1. Gilles Pison, The Population of the World (2005), 414 POPULATION &
SOCIETIES 1 (2005).
2. See id. at 3-4.
3. See generally John Pinder, THE BUILDING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3-
26 (3d ed. 1998).
4. See Pison, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Raj Bhala & Kevin Kennedy, Regional Trade Obligations § 2,
in WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS,
AND U.S. LAW (1998).
6. See, e.g., John H. Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the
Middle East: A Primer For US. Companies, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 413 (2005);
Ryan McCormick, The African Growth and Opportunity Act: The Perils of
Pursuing African Development Through US. Trade Law, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339
(2006).
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The extent to which the law making function addresses
transborder relationships depends partly on geographical proximity
and partly on the condition of underlying political and economic
relationships. Geographical proximity is an important determinant
in the movement of ordinary individuals, for example, laborers,
and in commerce in ordinary goods, such as food stuffs. 7 At the
same time, political and economic relationships can facilitate,
reduce, or nullify the potential for transborder relationships
between countries near and far.8 Consider, for example, the
transaction-facilitating relationships within the European Union
and between Canada and the United States, compared with the
strained relationships between Israel and Palestine, or Pakistan and
India, or Cuba and the United States.
These geopolitical relationships between different communities
are various and of course subject to continual changes. The
complicated relationships between Israel and Egypt or between
China and Taiwan are illustrative.
It is a common feature of most of these transborder
relationships that they include a large national system, such as
China in Asia, France and Germany in Europe, and the United
States in the Western Hemisphere. Of course, these national
systems are themselves of various size and political and legal
complexity. France, for example, is relatively homogenous, while
the United States has quite visible internal regional differences,
suggested by the demarcation between the "red" and "blue" states
in recent elections. However, whether relatively homogenous or
internally diverse, the societies in these national regimes are mass
societies whose legal systems must be adapted accordingly.
Further dimensions of "scale" are confronted where national
regimes coalesce in transnational arrangements such as the
European Union or NAFTA: National mass communities become
international mass communities.
9
II. THE POLITICAL REGIME OF MASS SOCIETY
For simplicity of analysis, we can suppose that the model
political unit in today's world is a system with 100 million in
population. This is much smaller than China, and considerably
7. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991).
8. Paul Krugman, The Move Toward Free Trade Zones, 76 ECON.
REV.-FED. RES. BANK KANSAS CITY 5 (1991).
9. John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in
THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63, 63-82 (Jeffrey A. Frankel
ed., 1998).
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smaller than Europe and the United States, but it is about the size
of Iran, Japan, and Mexico, for example.' 0
A political unit of this population already is in scale a mass
society. Certainly it is so compared with the size of the nation
states that came into being in Europe three or four hundred years
ago, and which have become the prototype of the modem state."
Those were political units whose populations were in the model
range of ten million or less, most of whom were living in the
countryside or in small villages. 12
Obviously there are many differences between the societies of
three hundred years ago and those of today. Differences in
communication and transportation are most salient, for example,
between horse and buggy and canal barge, on one hand, and
highways and airways on the other. However, the differences in
scale are themselves of great significance. It is worth considering
some of the differences in the tasks of maintaining community and
carrying through governance that are implicated by this difference
in scale.
One characteristic is urbanization. Most people in mass
societies live in cities.' 3 Virtually all modem communities are
highly urbanized and are becoming more so. It is a universal
phenomenon of our era that people on the farm and in the villages
leave for the city and indeed for the megalopolis. 14 Cities have
their own peculiar legal problems, from crowd control to handling
household garbage and other nuisances.
Another characteristic is that most civic, economic, and
political functions must respond not merely to occasional demands
but to thousands or millions of participants and transactions on a
routine basis: food supply and distribution; water and electricity
supply; housing; transportation; education; police and other
security systems; payment systems, banking and other financial
systems; manufacturing services, such as repair or equipment; etc.
The unfortunate present situation in Iraq is a vivid illustration of
the effects of disrupting these networks."
10. Pison, supra note 1, at 4.
11. David Grigg, POPULATION. GROWTH AND AGRARIAN CHANGE: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 51-63 (1980).
12. Id. at 61, tbl. 7.
13. United Nations Population Fund, State of World Population 1996:
Changing Places: Population, Development and the Urban Future, Introduction
to Chapter 1 (Alex Marshall ed.), available at http://www.unfpa.org/swp/1996/
index.htm.
14. Id. at Ch. 4.
15. Struggling to Pick Up the Pieces, ECONOMIST.COM/GLOBAL AGENDA,
Aug. 23, 2005, at 1.
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A related characteristic is that virtually all of these functions
require continual cooperation among a large number of working
groups that provide food supply, police, payment systems, etc.
The functions are carried out in small enterprises and big
businesses and in large and small government offices and bureaus.
The peasant behind the plow and the housewife in the cottage are
nearly obsolete figures. The epitome of the worker in a modem
economy is the salary man, to use the Japanese term; the model
residence for the modem worker is a high rise in the city. Both the
worker and his or her abode require complex interacting
arrangements to keep functioning.
Moreover, in most of these model political units, the members
of the population are relatively young and correspondingly
"alienated," that is, unstable in their place in society, in their
affinities with others, and indeed in their self-identities.' 6 They
are, understandably, readily influenced by simple ideas that
promise remedies for these afflictions-fashions such as consumer
goods and services and instant political action. At the same time,
some of these societies have to deal with aging populations of
people who are also alienated on different terms. The millions of
"grey-heads" in Europe and Japan, and many also in the United
States, wonder where the good old days have gone, or are in
prospect of going, such as their pensions and health benefits.'
7
III. BURGEONING OF LEGAL CONTROLS
These and other characteristics of mass society require
correspondingly complex mechanisms of coordination. Mechanisms
of coordination are of course required even in simple societies, but
rural and village societies function primarily on local custom and
usage. Mass societies have customs and usages but they also require
a much higher quotient of formal legal regulations. Accordingly,
mass societies experience an escalation of legal regulations and
procedures. 18
The basic mechanisms of social coordination are the market
and the government agency. Both markets and government
16. See, e.g., Survey: The Young: Know Future, 357 THE ECONOMIST S6
(2001).
17. David E. Rosenbaum, The 1992 Campaign: Polls; Older Americans Are
Found More Alienated Than the Young, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at A13;
Stephanie Strom, In Japan, Golden Years Have Lost Their Glow, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2000, at H7; see also Bruno Contini & Roberto Leombruni, From Work
to Retirement: A Tale of Bumpy Routes, 18 REv. POL. ECoN. 359 (2006).
18. See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 1.1- 1.7 (2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2006).
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agencies operate in terms of legal rules and procedures, including
rules of property and contract in market systems and rules of
jurisdiction and bureaucratic procedure in operation of
government. The law of property and contract in modem society is
highly complex. Indeed, there is no longer "a" law of property or
contract but several subspecies such as the law of condominiums in
property law, consumer transactions in contract law, intellectual
property, etc. The law governing government agencies has
undergone parallel subdivision. That body of public law formerly
was embraced in the concept of administrative law but it has now
devolved into agency-specific technicalities.' 9 The rules governing
civil wrongs-"torts" in common law parlance-have undergone
similar proliferation. The general concepts of "reasonable care,"
"nuisance," and "fiduciary duty" now only introduce the subject.
The private law of civil wrongs merges into public law regulatory
regimes involving particulars such as speed limits and legal
requirements concerning the manufacture and maintenance of
products offered in today's mass markets.
The corpus juris of every modern society-the complete book
of governing regulations-would run to thousands of pages, if
indeed such a book could be fully compiled. The sheer volume of
regulations required in modern society is an important defining
aspect of modern mass justice, but not the only one.
IV. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MASS JUSTICE
Analysis of the special characteristics of mass justice can focus
on those that appear most significant. These can be identified as
follows:
1. Political "distance" between legislative policy-
making and adjudicative administration ofjustice;
2. Dominance of "technicality" over "morality" in
legal rules;
3. Estrangement among professional participants in
administration of justice;
4. Impersonality of the adjudicative process itself,
including a tendency to technicality;
5. The burden of quantity of caseload on quality of
justice; and
6. Statistical dimensions of "justice" in mass justice.
19. Id. at § 1.3.
11072007]
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Adequately exploring these characteristics is a major
undertaking beyond the present occasion, but a brief sketch is
possible.
A. Political Distance
The fundamental constitutional premise of modem democratic
regimes is that public policy is made. by a legislative body
responsible to the electorate, or at least made under close
supervision of such a legislature. 2 However, as the need for legal
regulation has expanded quantitatively, the practical capacity of
popular legislative participation has correspondingly receded.
Regulations increasingly are initiated, formulated, and
promulgated by professional officials in bureaucratic agencies.
The formulation process involves varying degrees of interaction
with representatives of interest groups, which can provide a
measure of transparency and accountability to the policy-making
involved. However, almost by definition, there is little or no
interaction with truly representative spokespersons for the average
citizen.
The result is a gap, often a chasm, between the content of
policy and the constitutional basis of policy-making authority. The
discrepancy has been widely deplored, for example in the
European Union where the machinations of "Brussels bureaucrats"
are complained of, and in the United States, where the culprits are
the "Beltway bandits.' But the phenomenon is ubiquitous and
the remedies not obvious, perhaps nonexistent. However, the
result is a diminution of legitimacy at the policy level. The
diminished legitimacy is felt through the system down to the level
of adjudications.
B. Technicality over Morality
Modem legislation, especially regulations generated in the
administrative bureaucracies, is the product of more or less well-
informed analysis of the circumstances in which regulations are to
be applied.22 Regulatory language is crafted to balance competing
value considerations and interest group demands, typically with
elaborate qualifications and exceptions. The aim, understandable
20. Robert A. Dahl, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 232-33 (1989).
21. Tim Shipman, New Map of Britain That Makes Kent Part of France...
and It's a German Idea, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 4, 2006, at 10; It's Corruption,
Stupid; After Jack Abramoff, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 13.
22. Koch, supra note 18, at § 4.10.
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and commendable, is to strike an acceptable balance among
rhetorical objectives that are functionally incompatible and to
avoid unintended consequences. However, the result is also
regulation often lacking much moral force. The ancient concept of
obligation to obey the spirit of the law and not merely its letter is
increasingly incoherent.
23
C. Estrangement of the Professionals
The devolution of law into specialized subfields entails
specialization of the professionals involved, among judges and
other judicial officers, among the practicing legal profession, and
among the academic commentators and critics. That specialization
in turn results in estrangement between the subfield specialists.
Adjudication at the first instance level is apportioned to specialized
tribunals, such as labor courts, commercial courts, family courts,
social welfare bureaus, etc. Judges at the appellate level may be
similarly specialized or become unavoidably more preoccupied
with problems of jurisdiction and procedure. The practicing bar
and legal academia have undergone parallel fragmentation. In civil
law systems, the traditional separation of the judiciary from the
practicing bar perhaps has become greater; in common law
systems, the old camaraderie of bench and bar is less intimate.
Legal generalists are a dying breed.24
D. Impersonality of the Legal Process
In principle the law should be administered "impersonally" in
the sense of being impartial. But it also should be intensely
personal in concentrating on the unique features of every case.
The classic model is King Solomon sitting as judge in the parental
rights case and directly confronting the contending claimants of
being mother of the child.2 5  For litigants the essence of
adjudication is the opportunity to. state their case in their own
words to someone who is actually listening. In contrast, justice in
mass justice systems is unavoidably routinized, often into
stereotyped decision-making. Most cases in mass justice systems
are resolved not through adjudication but through negotiation in
23. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying'" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385-86 (1992).
24. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Changing Structures in the Practice of
Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 167, 167-69 (2000).
25. 1 Kings 3:16-3:28.
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which litigants tell their story only to legal counselors or
caseworkers, and often only through a written form.
E. Quantity Determines Quality
The routinization of legal process is the system's necessary
adaptation to the burden of volume.26 Many legal systems in the
modem era are starved for resources-not enough judges, not
enough clerks, even not enough courtrooms. In some systems the
delay in the calendar means effectively that all but a few cases will
never get to trial. In some systems indefinite postponement is
indeed a primary technique of disposition. But even systems that
can handle the volumes must deal with the cases through
techniques adjusted to sheer volume as such: separation of
individual cases into discrete segments, waiting lines, standardized
documentation, formulas for dispositions, etc. 2
A further recourse that legal systems must make is to revise
substantive legal standards to accommodate volume. Thus,
compensation in industrial accidents is typically resolved by
monetary formulas correlated with standardized definitions of
injury; custody of children in marital dissolution is typically
resolved by formulas correlated to the child's age and the parents'
occupational situation; sentencing of. convicted offenders is
imposed according to prescriptions correlated with categories of
offense and offender, etc. These standardizations may make for
greater uniformity and therefore equality in disposition. Perhaps
more important from the viewpoint of the legal system, however,
they permit the cases to be resolved without extended discussion-
but also without extended reflection.
F. Statistical Dimensions of "Justice " in Mass Justice
Intelligently addressing the problems of mass justice requires
thinking of legal problems in statistical terms, as Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes implied over a century ago.28 Statistical thinking
simply means giving attention to the number and characteristics of
26. See, e.g., Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs
Some Grease: Designing the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1997).
27. See id.
28. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The
Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of New Hall of the Boston
University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)
(asserting that "the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics").
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the type of legal case under consideration. It is contrasted with
giving attention to the characteristics of an individual case.
Statistical thinking is in tension, perhaps contradiction, with classic
modes of legal thought in both common law and civil law
traditions.
The tension between the common law case method and
statistics is perhaps obvious. The model of the common law
method is that of a judge deciding an individual case in the light of
precedent. Legal pronouncements in the common law method
come in specific formulations, tied to specific facts. The method
impliedly excludes the legal generalizations of legislation, and its
focus on specific instances excludes explicit consideration of a
panorama of eventualities. The implicit premise is that wise
judges can draw upon wisdom of previous wise judges and on their
experience in life to deal serially with "cases of trouble." 29 A more
deeply buried premise is that the judges' sense of justice and
education in law adequately reflect community sentiment of the
relevant political community. A still more deeply buried premise
is that community life can in the meantime proceed satisfactorily,
the future taking care of itself.
Legal pronouncement in the common law case method is in
very realistic individualistic terms: The facts of the case directly
confront the decision-makers. However, it is anti-quantitative and
its logic is inductive, with the major premise often being only
implicit or incompletely articulated. The picture of larger reality is
obscure, being envisioned if at all only in the minds of the judges,
advocates, and other professional participants.
Legislation in the common law system is essentially curative,
cleaning up and restating the accumulation of particular decisions.
Only in this retrospective posture are the broader quantitative
dimensions taken into account.
The civil law system formally proceeds in the opposite logical
direction, beginning with general legislative prescriptions.
30
Conventionally, the civil law ignores the fact that its original form,
the Justinian Code, was synthesized from case law, and that its
generalities should be interpreted in that light. In civil law theory,
complete meaning can be extracted from the language of the rules.
Discernment of meaning may not be problematic in clear cases, but
it may not be recognized that the concept of a clear case is itself
problematic. Legal concepts such as "reasonable care," "fair
29. Karl N. Llewellyn & E. Adamson Hoebel, THE CHEYENNE WAY viii
(1941).
30. See John Henry Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 40-49 (1969).
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price," "privacy," and "public order" are inevitably dependent on
the local community environment.
However, the civil law system like its common law companion
does not ordinarily require or invite factual surveys of the relevant
social environment. 3 r  The "Brandeis brief' setting forth
background social facts, for example, is unfamiliar and indeed
perhaps repugnant in civil law litigation. The extent to which
legislation in civil law systems is based on adequate background
information apparently is largely unexplored. As in the common
law system, the operative social environment is that which is in the
minds of the judges, advocates, and other professional participants.
CONCLUSION
The problem of mass justice confronts all modem legal
systems, directly as in regimes with large populations, and at least
indirectly in smaller regimes. Mass justice presents issues of
epistemology, sociology, economics, and legal method quite
different from the classic techniques of formulating legal rules and
deciding legal disputes. There is much learning to be done in
dealing with it.
31. Seeid. at88.
1112 [Vol. 67
